Error-correcting codes that admit local decoding and correcting algorithms have been the focus of much recent research due to their numerous theoretical and practical applications. An important goal is to obtain the best possible tradeoffs between the number of queries the algorithm makes to its oracle (the locality of the task), and the amount of redundancy in the encoding (the information rate).
Introduction
Classically, an error-correcting code is a tuple (Enc, Dec) of encoding and decoding algorithms employed by a sender to encode messages, and by a receiver to decode them, after potential corruption by a noisy channel during transmission. Specifically, the sender encodes a message m of k symbols from an alphabet Σ into a codeword c of block-length n consisting of symbols over the same alphabet, via Enc : Σ k → Σ n . The receiver uses Dec : Σ n → Σ k to recover the message from a received word w ∈ Σ n , a corrupted version of some Enc(m). Codes over the binary alphabet Σ = {0, 1} are preferred in practice. The quantities of interest in designing classical codes are the information rate, defined as k/n, and the error rate, which is the tolerable fraction of errors in the received word. Codes with both large information rate and large error rate are most desirable.
In modern uses of error-correcting codes, one may only need to recover small portions of the message, such as a single bit. In such settings, the decoder may not need to read the entire received word w ∈ Σ n , but only read a few bits of it. Given an index i ∈ [n] and oracle access to w, a local decoder must make only q = o(n) queries into w, and output the bit m i . Codes that admit such fast decoders are called locally decodable codes (LDCs) [KT00, STV99] . The parameter q is called the locality of the decoder. A related notion is that of locally correctable codes (LCCs). LCCs are codes for which the local decoder with oracle access to w must output bits of the codeword c, instead of bits of the message m. LDCs and LCCs have widespread applications in many areas of theoretical computer science, including private information retrieval, probabilistically checkable proofs, self-correction, fault-tolerant circuits, hardness amplification, and data structures (e.g., [BFLS91, LFKN92, BLR93, BK95, CKGS98, CGdW13, ALRW17]). See surveys [Tre04, Gas04] . However, constructions of such codes suffer from apparently irreconcilable tension between locality and rate: existing codes with constant locality have slightly subexponential blocklength [Yek08, Efr12, DGY11], and codes of linear blocklength have slightly subpolynomial query complexity [KMRS17] . See surveys by Yekhanin [Yek12] and by Kopparty and Saraf [KS16] .
Ben-Sasson et al.
[BGH + 06] propose the notion of relaxed locally decodable codes (RLDCs) that remedies the dramatic tradeoffs of classical LDCs. In this notion the decoding algorithm is allowed to output ⊥ sometimes, to signal that it does not know the correct value; however, it should not output an incorrect value too often. More formally, given i ∈ [k] and oracle access to the received word w assumed to be relatively close to some codeword c = Enc(m) ∈ Σ n , the local decoder (1) outputs m i if w = c; (2) outputs either m i or ⊥ with probability 2/3, otherwise; and (3) the set of indices i such that the decoder outputs m i (the correct value) with probability 2/3 is of size > ρ · k for some constant ρ > 0. The relaxed definition allows them to achieve RLDCs with constant query complexity and blocklength n = k 1+ǫ .
Recently, Gur et al.
[GRR18] introduce the analogous notion of relaxed locally correctable codes (RLCCs). In particular, upon receiving a word w ∈ Σ n assumed to be close to some codeword c, the decoder: (1) outputs c i if w = c; (2) outputs either c i or ⊥ with probability 2/3, otherwise; and (3) the set of indices i such that the decoder outputs c i with probability 2/3 is of size ρ · k, for some ρ > 0. In fact, [GRR18] omits condition (3) in their definition, since the first two conditions imply the 3rd, for codes with constant locality that can withstand a constant fraction of error [BGH + 06]. The reduction from [BGH + 06], however, does not maintain the asymptotic error rate, and in particular, in the non-constant query complexity regime, the error rate becomes subconstant. Since our results work in the ω(1)-query regime, we will build codes that achieve the 3rd condition as well (for constant error rate). The results in [GRR18] obtain significantly better parameters for RLCCs than for classical LCCs; namely, they construct RLCCs with constant query complexity, polynomial block length, and constant error rate, and RLCCs with quasipolynomial query complexity, linear blocklength (constant rate), with the caveat that the error rate is subconstant. These results immediately extend to RLDCs, since their codes are systematic, meaning that the initial part of the encoding consists of the message itself.
Computationally Bounded, Adversarial Channels In this work we study RLDCs and RLCCs in the more restricted, yet natural, computationally bounded adversarial channel, introduced by Lipton [Lip94] . All the above constructions of local codes assume a channel that may introduce a bounded number of adversarial errors, and the channel has as much time as it needs to decide what positions to corrupt. This setting corresponds to Hamming's error model, in which codes should be resilient to any possible error pattern, as long as the number of corruptions is bounded. Hence, codes built for the Hamming channel are safe for data transmission, but the drastic requirements lead to coding limitations. By contrast, in his foundational work, Shannon proposes a weaker, probabilistic channel in which each symbol is corrupted independently, with some fixed probability.
In [Lip94] , Lipton argues that many reasonable channels stand somewhere in between these two extremes, and one may assume that in reality adversaries are computationally bounded, and can be modeled as polynomial time probabilistic (PPT) algorithms. Variants of this model have been initially studied for classical error-correcting codes [Lip94, DGL04, MPSW05, GS16, SS16] to show better error rate capabilities than in the Hamming model. See also Appendix A for further details on related work.
Ostrovsky et al. [OPS07] introduce the study of "private" locally decodable codes against computationally bounded channels, and build codes with constant information and error rates over the binary alphabet, which can correct every message bit using only a small (superconstant) number of queries to the corrupted word. Their results assume the existence of one-way functions, and require that the encoding and decoding algorithms share a secret key that is not known to the channel. Hemenway and Ostrovky [HO08] and Hemenway et al.
[HOSW11] construct public-key LDCs assuming the existence of Φ-hiding schemes [CMS99] and of IND-CPA secure cryptosystems, respectively.
By contrast, our constructions of RLDCs and RLCCs do not require the sender and receiver to exchange cryptographic keys. Instead our constructions are based on the existence of collision-resilient hash functions, a standard cryptographic assumption. Because the parameters of a collisionresistant hash function are public, any party (sender/receiver/attacker) is able to compute it.
Our Contributions
We start by defining the version of relaxed locally correctable codes that is relevant for our model. We remark that our codes are systematic as well, and therefore the results also apply to the RLDCs analogue.
Since these codes interact with an adversarial channel, their strength is not only measured in their error correction and locality capabilities (as is the case for RLCCs/RLDCs in the Hamming channel), but also in the security they provide against the channel. We present these codes while describing how they interact with the channel, in order to make the analogy with the classical setting. We use the notation Enc and Dec to denote encoding and decoding algorithms.
Definition 2.1 A local code is a tuple (Gen, Enc, Dec) of probabilistic algorithms such that
• Gen(1 λ ) takes as input security parameter λ and generates a public seed s ∈ {0, 1} * . This public seed s is fixed once and for all.
• Enc takes as input the public seed s and a message x ∈ Σ k and outputs a codeword c = Enc(s, x) with c ∈ Σ n .
• Dec takes as input the public seed s, an index i ∈ [n], and is given oracle access to a word w ∈ Σ n . Dec w (s, i) outputs a symbol b ∈ Σ (which is supposed to be the value at position i of the closest codeword to w).
We say that the (information) rate of the code (Gen, Enc, Dec) is k/n. We say that the code is efficient if Gen, Enc, Dec are all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms.
Definition 2.2 A computational adversarial channel A with error rate τ is an algorithm that interacts with a local code (Gen, Enc, Dec) in rounds, as follows. In each round of the execution, given a security parameter λ,
(1) Generate s ← Gen(1 λ ); s is public, so Enc, Dec, and A have access to s (2) The channel A on input s hands a message x to the sender.
(3) The sender computes c = Enc(s, x) and hands it back to the channel (in fact the channel can compute c without this interaction).
(4) The channel A corrupts at most τ n entries of c to obtain a word w ∈ Σ n and selects a challenge index i ∈ [n]; w is given to the receiver's Dec with query access along with the challenge index i.
(5) The receiver outputs b ← Dec w (s, i).
(6) We define A(s)'s probability of fooling Dec on this round to be p A,s = Pr[b ∈ {⊥, c i }], where the probability is taken only over the randomness of the Dec w (s, i). We say that A(s) is γ-successful at fooling Dec if p A,s > γ. We say that A(s) is ρ-successful at limiting Dec if |Good A,s | < ρ·n, where Good A,s ⊆ [n] is the set of indices j such that Pr[Dec w (s, j) = c j ] > 2 3 . We use Fool A,s (γ, τ, λ) (resp. Limit A,s (ρ, τ, λ)) to denote the event that the attacker was γ-successful at fooling Dec (resp. ρ-successful at limiting Dec) on this round.
We now define our secure RLCC codes against computational adversarial channels. Definition 2.3 ((Computational) Relaxed Locally Correctable Codes (CRLCC)) A local code (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a (q, τ, ρ, γ(·), µ(·))-CRLCC against a class A of adversaries if Dec w makes at mostueries to w and satisfies the following:
, where the randomness is taken over the selection of s ← Gen(1 λ ) as well as A's random coins.
(3) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[Limit A,s (ρ, τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the selection of s ← Gen(1 λ ) as well as A's random coins.
When µ(λ) = 0, γ(λ) = 1 3 is a constant and A is the set of all (computationally unbounded) channels we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-RLCC. When µ(·) is a negligible function and A is restricted to the set of all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attackers we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-CRLCC (computational relaxed locally correctable code).
We say that a code that satisfies conditions 1 and 2 is a Weak CRLCC, while a code satisfying conditions 1, 2 and 3 is a Strong CRLCC code.
We construct Weak and Strong CRLCCs against PPT adversaries, under the assumption that Collision-Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF) exist. Briefly, a CRHF function is a pair (GenH, H) of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms, where GenH takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a public seed s ∈ {0, 1} * ; the function H : {0, 1} * × Σ * → Σ ℓ(λ) , takes as input the seed s and a long enough input that is hashed into a string of length ℓ(λ). We note that H is deterministic upon fixing s. The value ℓ(λ) is the length of the hash function. (GenH, H) is said to be collision-resistant if for all PPT adversaries that take as input the seed s generated by Gen(1 λ ), the probability that they produce a collision pair (x, x ′ ), i.e. such that H(s, x) = H(s, x ′ ) and x = x ′ , is negligible in 1 λ .
Theorem 2.4 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH, H) with length ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′ there is a constant 0 < ρ(τ ) < 1 , such there exists a constant rate (ℓ(λ)·polylog n, τ, ρ(τ ), γ(·), µ(·))-Weak CRLCC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylog λ and λ ∈ Θ(n) then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-Weak CRLCC.
We note that in the above constructions the codes withstand a constant error rate. The classical RLCCs of [GRR18] achieve (log n) O(log log n) query complexity, constant information rate, but subconstant error rate, in the Hamming channel. In order to obtain Strong CRLCC we need further technical insights, that builds upon the Weak CRLCCs. Our Strong CRLCCs have the same parameters, with only a polylog n loss in query complexity.
Theorem 2.5 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH, H) with length ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′ there exist constants 0 < r(τ ), ρ(τ ) < 1 such that there exists a (ℓ(λ) · polylog n, τ, ρ(τ ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLCC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet with rate r(τ ) where r(.) and ρ(.) have the property that lim τ →0 r(τ ) = 1 and lim τ →0 ρ(τ ) = 1. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylog λ and λ ∈ Θ(n) then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ(τ ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLCC.
Remark 2.6 We remark that any Weak CRLCC can be trivially converted into a Strong CRLCC e.g., by repeating the last bit of the codeword cn times to obtain a new codeword of length (c + 1)n. If we select the constant c > 0 large enough then we can guarantee that, say τ (c + 1)n ≤ 4cn/10, so that a majority of these repeated bits in the codeword are not corrupted and can be corrected with a simply majority vote. Thus, we can artificially ensure that ρ(τ ) > c c+1 since at least cn bits (out of (c + 1)n bits) of the codeword can be locally recovered by majority vote. However, to ensure that ρ(τ ) > 2 3 we would need to set c = 2 which necessarily reduces the rate to r(τ ) < 1 c+1 = 1 3 . By contrast, our Strong CRLCC has rate r(τ ) which approaches 1 as τ approaches 0. Furthermore, we have the property that ρ(τ ) approaches 1 as τ approaches 0 which means that almost all bits of the original codeword can be locally recovered. We also remark that our constructions are systematic and can be tweaked to yield the existence of a Strong CRLDC with the same parameters. See additional discussion in Appendix E.
Technical Ingredients
At a technical level our construction uses two main building blocks: local expander graphs and collision resistant hash functions.
Local Expander Graphs Intuitively, given a graph G = (V, E) and distinguished subsets A, B ⊆ V of nodes such that A and B are disjoint and |A| ≤ |B| we say that the pair (A, B) contains a δ-expander if for all X ⊆ A and Y ⊆ B with |X| > δ|B| and |Y | > δ|B| there is an edge connecting X and Y i.e., (X × Y ) ∩ E = ∅. We say that a DAG G is a δ-local expander around a node v if for any radius r > 0 and any node v ≥ 2r the pair A = {v − 2r + 1, . . . , v − r} and B = {v − r + 1, . . . , v} contain a δ-expander and the pair C = {v, . . . , v + r − 1} and D = {v + r, . . . , v + 2r − 1} contain a δ-expander. When this property holds for every node v ∈ V (G) = {1, . . . , n} we simply say that the DAG G is a δ-local expander. For any constant δ > 0 it is possible to (explicitly) construct a δ-local expander with the property that indeg(G) ∈ O (log n) and outdeg(G) ∈ O (log n) i.e. no node has more than O (log n) incoming or outgoing edges [EGS75, ABP18] .
Local expanders have several nice properties that have been recently exploited in the design and analysis of secure data-independent memory hard functions (iMHFs) [ABH17, ABP17, BZ17, ABP18]. For example, these graphs are maximally depth-robust [ABP18] . Even if we delete a large number of nodes S ⊆ V the graph still contains a directed path of length n − (1 + ǫ) |S| for some small constant ǫ dependent on δ -the constant ǫ can approach 0 as δ approaches 0 [ABP18] . More specifically, if we delete a large number of nodes S ⊆ V at least n − (1 + ǫ) |S| of the nodes have the property that they are α-good (with ǫ = 2−α α ) with respect to the deleted set S and any pair of α-good nodes u and v are connected by a directed path (provided that δ is sufficiently small) -a node v is α-good with respect to S if for any radius r < v we have at most αr nodes in S ∩[v−r+1, v] and for any radius r ≤ n−v+1 we have at most αr nodes in S ∩[v, v+r−1]. For more formal statements we point the reader to Appendix B. In the context of memory hard functions each node in the graph corresponds to an intermediate data value generated during computation of the iMHFs and edges represent data-dependencies. It is known that an iMHF has high cumulative memory complexity [AS15] if and only if the underlying DAG G is depth-robust [AB16, ABP17] 1 .
Suppose that each node is colored red or green and that we are only allowed to query each node to obtain its color. If we let S denote the set of red nodes then we can develop an efficient randomized testing algorithm to check if a node v is α-good or not. The tester will make O (polylog n) queries and, with high probability, will accept any node v that is α 1 -good and will reject any node w that is not α 2 -good for any constants α 2 > 4 · α 1 . Intuitively, for each r ∈ {2 1 , 2 2 , . . . , 2 log n } the tester will sample O (polylog n) nodes in the intervals [v, r − 1] and [v − r + 1, v] to make sure that the fraction of red nodes is at most 2α 1 . If the tester determines that a node v is at least α 2 -good for an appropriately small constant α 2 then we can be (almost) certain that the long green path which contains all n − (1 + ǫ)|S| of the α 2 -good nodes also includes v. Furthermore, if v < 3n/4 then v has at least n/4 − (1 + ǫ)|S| descendants in this directed green path. Intuitively, in our construction any such node v must correspond to an uncorrupted portion of the codeword.
Collision Resistant Hash Functions Our constructions employ collision resistant hash functions as a building block. While most of the recent progress on memory hard functions in cryp-tography combines local expanders (depth-robust graphs) with random oracles (e.g., see [AS15, AT17, ABP18]), we stress that we do not need to work in the random oracle model 2 . Indeed, our constructions only assume the existence of collision resistant hash functions.
Weak CRLCCs We first explain our construction of Weak CRLCCs, which involves labeling a δ-local expander with k nodes. In particular, given an input word x = (x 1 • . . . • x k ) (broken up into bit strings of length ℓ(λ)) and a k node local expander graph G, the label of node v is computed as
, where ℓ v 1 ,s , . . . , ℓ v d ,s are the labels of the parents v 1 , . . . , v d of node v, and • denotes string concatenation. When ℓ(λ) ∈ O (polylog λ) we will select λ ∈ O (n) to ensure that ℓ(λ) ∈ O (polylog n). We use the notation Enc and Dec for the encoding and decoding of our construction, while we use ECC and ECCD to denote the efficient encoding and decoding algorithms for a good binary code with constant rate and relative distance (e.g., [Jus72, SS96]) which can decode efficiently from some constant fractions of errors.
We first apply ECC to x 1 , . . . , x k to obtain codewords c 1 , . . . , c k ∈ {0, 1} O(ℓ(λ)) where c i = ECC(x i ). Also, for v ∈ [k] we let c v+k = ECC(ℓ v,s ) which is the encoding of the label corresponding to the node v in G. The final output is c = (c 1 • . . .
. . = c 3k = c 2k consists of k copies of the last codeword c 2k . The final word is an n bit message with n = O (kℓ (λ)). By repeating this last codeword k times we ensure that it is not possible for the attacker to irreparably corrupt the final label ℓ k,s .
Given a (possibly corrupted) codeword c ′ produced by a PPT attacker A we let
. We say that a node v is green if it is locally consistent i.e.,
otherwise, we say that the node is red. We first show that if a green node has the correct label ℓ ′ v,s = ℓ v,s then it must be the case that x ′ v = x v and ℓ ′ v i ,s = ℓ v i ,s for each i ≤ d -otherwise A would have found a hash collision! If a graph contains too many red nodes then this is easily detectable by random sampling and our weak local decoder is allowed to output ⊥ if it detects any red nodes. Our local decoder will first obtain the final label ℓ k,s by random sampling some labels from ℓ ′ k,s,1 , . . . , ℓ ′ k,s,k and checking to make sure each of these labels is equal to ℓ ′ k,s . If this check passes then with high probability we must have ℓ ′ k,s = ℓ k,s since the attacker cannot corrupt too many of these labels. Second, our local decoder will test to make sure that the last node k is at least α 2 -good. If this node is not α 2 -good then we must have found a red node and our weak decoder may output ⊥; otherwise the last node serves as an anchor point. In particular, since label ℓ k,s = ℓ ′ k,s in this case collision resistance now implies that for any α 2 -good node v then we must have x ′ v = x v and ℓ v,s = ℓ ′ v,s since v must be connected to the node k by a green path.
Strong CRLCCs The reason that the previous construction fails to yield a high rate Strong CRLCCs is that it is possible for an attacker to change every node to a red-node by tampering with at most O (k · ℓ(λ)/ log k) bits. In particular, since the δ-local expander G has outdegree O (log k) an attacker who tampers with just O (ℓ(λ)) bits could tamper with one of the labels so that
Now for every w ∈ [k] s.t. G contains the directed edge (v, w) the node w will be red and there are up to O (log k) = O (log n) such nodes w. We address this issue by first applying a degree reduction gadget to our family {G t } ∞ t=1 of δ-local expanders, where t = O k ℓ(λ)·log k , to obtain a new family of DAGs as follows: First, we replace every node u ∈ [t] from G t with a chain u 1 , . . . , u m of m = O (log t) nodes -we will refer to node u ∈ [t] as the meta-node for this group. The result is a new graph G with k = m · t nodes. Each of the nodes u 1 , . . . , u m−1 will have constant indegree and constant outdegree. However, for i < m we include the directed edges (u i , u i+1 ) and (u i , u m ) -the node u m will have indeg(u m ) ∈ Θ(m). Furthermore, if we have an edge (u, v) in G t then we will add an edge of the (u m , v j ) for some j < m -this will be done in such a way that maintains indeg(v j ) ≤ 2 for each j < m. Therefore, the node u m will have outdeg(u m ) ∈ Θ(log t). We now note that if the label ℓ ′ um,s = ℓ um,s and the node u m is green then, by collision resistance, it must be the case that ℓ ′ u i ,s = ℓ u i ,s and x ′ u i = x u i for every u i with i ≤ m.
With this observation in mind we tweak our last construction by grouping the values ℓ v i ,s and x v i into groups of size m ∈ O (log t) before applying the error correcting code. In particular, given our input word x divided into k = m · t distinct ℓ(λ)-bit strings x v i for i ≤ m and v ≤ t, our final output will consist of c = (c 1 , . . . , c 3t ) where c i = ECC(x (i−1)m+1 , . . . , x im ) for i ≤ t and c v+t = ECC (ℓ v 1 ,s • . . . • ℓ vm,s ) and c 2t+1 = . . . = c 3t = c 2t consists of t copies of c 2t . The final codeword c will have length n ∈ O (tm · ℓ(λ)) = O (k · ℓ(λ)) bits. By grouping blocks together we get the property that an attacker that wants to alter an individual label ℓ v i ,s must pay to flip at least Ω (ℓ(λ) · m) bits of c v+t . Thus, the attacker is significantly restricted in the way he can tamper with the labels e.g., the attacker cannot tamper with one label in every group.
We say that the meta-node u ∈ [t] = V (G t ) containing nodes u 1 , . . . , u m ∈ V (G) is green if (1) node u m is green, and (2) at least 2m/3 of the nodes u 1 , . . . , u m are green. We say that an edge (u, v) ∈ E(G t ) in the meta-graph is red if the corresponding edge (u m , v j ) ∈ E(G) is incident to a red node; otherwise we say that the edge (u, v) is green. We can then define the green meta-graph G g by dropping all red edges from G t . We remark that, even if we flip a (sufficiently small) constant fraction of the bits in c we can show that most of the meta-nodes must be green -in fact, most of these meta-nodes must also be α 2 -good with respect to the set R of red-nodes. In particular, there are only two ways to turn a meta-node u red: (1) by paying to flip O (ℓ(λ) · m) bits in c u or c u+t , and (2) by corrupting at least m/3 other meta-nodes w such that the directed edge (w, u) is in G t .
Furthermore, we can introduce the (unknown) set T of tampered meta-nodes where for i ≤ 3t we say thatc i is tampered if ECC (ECCD(c i )) = c i . In this case the hamming distance between c i andc i must be at least O (ℓ(λ) · m) so the number |T | of tampered meta-nodes cannot be too large. While the set T is potentially unknown we can still show that most meta-nodes are α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T . In particular, there must exist some meta-node 3t 4 ≤ v ≤ t s.t. v is α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T . By collision resistance, it follows that for any meta-node u < v which is connected to v via a green path in G g we have u / ∈ T e.g., u is correct; otherwise we would have found a hash collision.
While G t is a δ-local expander the DAG G g may not be. However, we can show that, for suitable constants α and δ, if a node u is α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T then G g has 2δ-local expansion around u. Furthermore, if u < v has 4δ-local expansion in G g then we can prove that G g contains a path to the meta-node u. Our local decoder will test whether or not G g has local expansion by strategically sampling edges to see if they are green or red. Our decoder will output ⊥ with high probability if u does not have 4δ-local expansion in G g which is the desired behavior since we are not sure if there is a green path connecting u to v in this case. Whenever u does have 2δ-local expansion in G g the decoder will output ⊥ with negligible probability which is again the desired behavior since there is a green path from u to v in this case (and, hence, u T has not been tampered).
Remark 2.7 Recall that in Theorem 2.4 and Theorem 2.5 we construct a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-Weak CRLCC and a (polylog n, τ, ρ(τ ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLCC where µ(λ) represents the probability that the adversarial channel outputs a codewordc and challenge index i ∈ [k] that γ(λ)-fools the local decoder. Intuitively, we can think of µ(λ) as the probability that the codeword generated by the channel yields a hash collision and we can think of γ(λ) as the probability that we mis-identify a node (or meta-node) as being α-good. If there are no hash collisions then the only way that the local decoding algorithm can be fooled is when it mis-identifies a node (or meta-node) as being α-good. We show that both µ(·) and γ(·) are negligible functions.
Construction of Weak-CRLCC
In this section we overview the construction of a constant rate weak-CRLCC scheme. In order to show the existence of a CRLCC scheme, we need to construct the PPT algorithms Gen, Enc and Dec. Our construction will use a CRHF Π = (GenH, H). In particular, Gen 1 λ simply runs GenH 1 λ to output the public seed s.
The Enc algorithm uses the CRHF to create labels for the vertices of a δ-local expander. We now define the recursive labeling process for the vertices of any given DAG G using H.
, and a message x = (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k ) ∈ Σ k we define the labeling of graph G with x, lab G,s :
where v 1 , . . . , v d are the parents of vertex v in G, according to some predetermined topological order. We omit the subscripts G, s when the dependency on the graph G and public hash seed H is clear from context.
Enc Algorithm
In this section we describe the Enc algorithm which takes as input a seed s ← Gen 1 λ and a message x ∈ {0, 1} k , and returns a codeword c ∈ {0, 1} n . For a security parameter λ, let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} ℓ(λ) be a CRHF (see Definition B.3). We will assume that Enc has access to H. In this section we also let ECC : {0, 1} ℓ(λ) → {0, 1} 4·ℓ(λ) be a standard binary code with message length ℓ(λ) and block length 4 · ℓ(λ) (such as Justesen code [Jus72]) and let ECCD : {0, 1} 4·ℓ(λ) → {0, 1} ℓ(λ) be the decoder that efficiently decodes from ∆ J fraction of errors.
• Let lab G,s (x) = ℓ 1,s , . . . , ℓ k ′ ,s be the labeling of the graph G with input x and seed s.
• The codeword c consists of the block encoding of message x, followed by the encoded labeling of the graph using ECC, followed by k ′ copies of encoded ℓ k ′ . In particular, for each 1
. . .
. . . The parameter δ = 1/100 is an arbitrary simply chosen to satisfy Lemma B.10. Also, note that the codeword length is n = 4 · 3k ′ · ℓ(λ) over the binary alphabet {0, 1}, where ℓ(λ) is the length of the output of the CRHF H and the original message had length k = k ′ · ℓ(λ). Therefore, the rate k n of CRLCC scheme obtained from Enc is Θ(1).
Dec Algorithm
In this section, we detail a randomized algorithm Dec : {0, 1} n × [n] → {⊥} ∪ {0, 1} for Enc : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} n described in Section 3.1. We assume Dec has access to the same public seed s used by Enc as well as the δ-local expander used by Enc. We focus on the key ideas first and then provide the formal description of Dec. The notion of a green node is central to Dec.
v,s is consistent with the hash of its parent labels i.e.,
We say that a node v is correct if ℓ ′ v,s = ℓ v,s . Lemma 3.3 highlights one of the key reasons why green nodes are significant in our construction.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose that node v is green and correct (i.e., ℓ ′ v,s = ℓ v,s ) and suppose that there is a directed path from node u to node v consisting entirely of green nodes. Then either the node u is also correct (i.e., ℓ ′ u,s = ℓ u,s ) or the PPT adversary has produced a hash collision.
So, either the adversary has successfully found a hash collision, or
. Let v j be the parent node of v that lies on the green path from u to v. Assuming we have no hash collision, we can conclude that the node v j is both correct and green. Extending the same argument iteratively along the green path from u to v j , we get that either node u must be correct, or the adversary would have found a hash collision.
Our local decoder will output ⊥ if it ever detects any red nodes (Note that when the codeword is not corrupted we will have 0 red nodes).
We now consider two cases. Case 1: The input index i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ). This corresponds to a bit query within the last k ′ blocks. From the construction of the code, we know that the last k ′ blocks of the encoding are the same, i.e. c 2k ′ +j = c 2k ′ for all 1 ≤ j ≤ k ′ . In this case, Dec w simply queries some blocks in [2k ′ , 3k ′ ], decodes them to the nearest codeword and returns the corresponding bit of the majority codeword. Since the adversary cannot corrupt many blocks beyond the decoding radius, the majority will return the correct codeword with high probability. See Appendix C.1 for the formal proof.
Case 2: If the input index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ), Dec w uses the properties of the δ-local expander graph to detect whether the corresponding label has been tampered or not. If the label is tampered, then the decoder returns a ⊥ else it returns the i-th of the received vector. Let i ′ denote the index of the node in G associated with the queried bit i i.e., i ′ = i 4·ℓ(λ) mod k ′ . We check to make sure that (1) the node k ′ is at least α-good (w.r.t. the set of red nodes), and (2) the node i ′ is also α-good (for some α < 1 − 2δ). If either check fails then we will output ⊥. Otherwise, by Lemma 3.3 the node i ′ must be correct (with high probability) since (1) there is a green path connecting any two α-good nodes in a δ-local expander, and (2) the node k ′ must be correct (with high probability).
The core part of the Dec w then is the probabilistic procedure to verify that a node v is α-good. First, it is clear that there is a deterministic procedure IsGreen w (v) that checks whether a given node v ∈ [k ′ ] is green or not using O (log n) coordinate queries to w (see Lemma C.2 for the formal statement). Now in order to verify if a node v is α-good, we need to estimate the fraction of green nodes in any neighborhood of it. This is achieved by designing a tester that accepts v if it is α/4-good with respect to the set S of red nodes and rejects with high probability if v is not α-good (formalized in Lemma C.3).
The key observation behind Lemma C.3 is that it suffices to check that
and [v, v + 2 j − 1] and use the subroutine IsGreen to count the number of red (resp. green) nodes in each interval. If for every j ≤ log k ′ the number of red nodes is both intervals at most α · 2 j /2 we accept. Otherwise, we reject.
Strong-CRLCC
In this section, we give an improved construction that locally corrects a majority of input coordinates.
The Barrier: The challenge in correcting a constant fraction of the nodes in the previous construction is that an adversary that is permitted to change O n log n symbols can turn all nodes red in a graph that has outdegree O (log n).
Key Idea: We overcome the above mentioned barrier using three ideas. First, we run the original δ-local expander G t through an indegree reduction gadget to obtain a new graph G with k ′ = t·m nodes in which almost every node has at most 2 incoming/outgoing edges and each node u in G t (called the meta-node) corresponds to m nodes u 1 , . . . , u m in G. During the encoding process we group the labels. Second, we group the labels ℓ u,s = (ℓ u 1 ,s , . . . , ℓ um,s ) and data values x u = (x u 1 , . . . , x um ) and include the encodings c u = ECC(x u ) and c u+t = ECC(ℓ u,s ) in our final codeword. Notice that if we receive a the codeword c ′ = c we can first preprocess each block c ′ i to obtainc i = ECC (ECCD(c ′ i )). Thus, if ECC (ECCD(c ′ i )) = c i we will say that the block i is untampered -even if c ′ i = c i . We say that a meta-node u is tampered if either of the blocks c u or c u+t were tampered and we use T to denote the set of tampered meta-nodes. We can show that most meta-nodes are not contained in the set T since the attacker must alter a constant fraction of the bits in c u or c u+t . In particular, the attacker has to flip at least Ω (m · ℓ(λ)) bits to tamper any of the meta-nodes. In this way we can ensure that an attacker must tamper with at least Ω (t · m · ℓ(λ)) bits to make Ω(t) meta-nodes red.
Third, we introduce the notion of the green subgraph G g of the meta-graph G t (see Definition D.6). In particular, G g is obtained from G t by discarding all red-edges (an edge (u, v) ∈ E(G t ) is red if the corresponding edge (u m , v j ) ∈ E(G) in G is incident to a red-node). As before a node v i in G is green if its hash value is locally consistent e.g.,
. We say that a meta-node u in G t is green if at least 2 3 of the corresponding nodes {u 1 , . . . , u m } in G are green and the last node u m is also green (Definition D.2). We show that the same key properties we used for the construction of Weak-CRLCC still hold with respect to the meta-nodes i.e., if there is a green path connecting meta-node u to meta-node v and the meta-node v is untampered (i.e., c v = ECC (ECCD(c ′ v )) and c v+t = ECC ECCD(c ′ v+t ) ) then the meta-node u is also untampered (i.e., c u = ECC (ECCD(c ′ u )) and c u+t = ECC ECCD(c ′ u+t ) ) ; otherwise we would have found a hash collision (Lemma D.16). If we let R denote the subset of red meta-nodes and if we let T denote the subset of (unknown) tampered meta-nodes we have G g contains the graph G t − (R ∪ T ). One can prove that most meta-nodes are α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T and that if a meta-node u is α-good with respect to the set R ∪ T then the green graph G g also has 2δ-local expansion around the meta-node u (Lemma D.12). Finally, if G g has δ ′ -local expansion around both of the meta-nodes u and v with δ ′ ≤ 4δ then there is a green path connecting u and v (Lemma D.14).
The remaining challenge is that the set T is unknown to the local decoder 3 . Thus, we cannot directly test if a node is α-good with respect to R ∪ T . What we can do is develop a test that accepts all meta-nodes that are α-good with respect to R ∪ T with high probability and rejects all meta-nodes u that do not have 4δ-local expansion in G g by sampling the number of red/green edges in between A i = [u, u + 2 i − 1] and B i = [u + 2 i , u + 2 i+1 − 1] for i ≥ 1. In particular, we restrict our attention to edges in the δ-expander graph H i,δ connecting A i and B i in G t , where H i,δ has maximum indegree d δ for some constant d δ which depends on δ. If G g is not a 4δ-local expansion around u then for some interval i a large number of red edges between A i and B i must have been removed -at least c 2 δ2 i red edges out of at most 2 i × d δ edges in H i,δ . By contrast, if u is α-good with respect to R ∪ T then we can show that at most c 1 α2 i d δ edges are deleted. For a suitably small value of α < δ d δ we can ensure that c 1 α2 i d δ < 4c 2 δ2 i . Thus, our tester can simply sample random edges in H i,δ and accept if and only the observed fraction f r,i of red edges is at most, say, 2c
The full description of the decoder is in Appendix D.
Graph Degree Reduction
We now describe our procedure ReduceDegree that takes as input a t node δ-local expander DAG G 0 with indegree m = O(log t) and outputs a new graph G with mt nodes. G has the property that most nodes have indegree two.
ReduceDegree: (Let G 0 be a δ-local expander.) Input: Graph G 0 with t vertices and m = max{indeg(G 0 ), outdeg(G 0 )} + 1 Output: Graph G with m · t vertices.
• For each node u in G 0 we add m nodes u 1 , . . . , u m to G. Along with each of the directed edges (u i , u i+1 ) and (u i , u m ) for i < m.
• For each directed edge (u, v) in G 0 we connect the final node u m to the first node v j that currently has indegree at most 1.
We call G 0 the meta-graph of G and we refer to nodes in G 0 as meta-nodes. In particular, the meta-node u ∈ V (G 0 ) corresponds to the simple nodes u 1 , . . . , u m ∈ V (G). Notice that for two meta-nodes u < v ∈ V (G 0 ) there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E(G 0 ) in the meta-graph if and only if G has an edge of the form (u m , v i ) for some i ≤ m. While our encoding algorithm will use the graph G to generate the labeling, it will be helpful to reason about meta-nodes in our analysis since the meta-graph G 0 is a δ-local expander. 
Enc Algorithm
In this section we describe the Enc algorithm which takes as input a seed s ← Gen 1 λ and a message x ∈ {0, 1} k and returns a codeword c ∈ {0, 1} n . For a security parameter λ, let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} ℓ(λ) be a CRHF (see Definition B.3). Recall that, ECC and ECCD denote the encoding and decoding algorithms of a good code of rate R = R(τ ) that can decode efficiently from some constant ∆ J = ∆ J (τ ) fraction of errors (Note: as τ → 0 we have ∆ J (τ ) → 0 and R(τ ) → 1).
Let β = β(τ ) > 0 be a parameter which can be tuned.
be a δ-local expander graph on t vertices and degree (indegree and outdegree) m = O (log t) where δ = δ(τ ) < 1 4 is a parameter than can be tuned as needed 4 . Let G := ReduceDegree(G 0 ) be the graph with k ′ := k βℓ(λ) nodes output by the degree reducing procedure applied to G 0 . Crucially, the graph has the property that for α = α(τ ) < 1 − 2δ(τ ) and any red/green coloring of the nodes of the graph that any pair of α-good meta-nodes with respect to the set T of tampered nodes are connected by a green path.
• Let (ℓ 1 1 ,s , . . . , ℓ 1m,s , . . . , ℓ t 1 ,s . . . , ℓ tm,s ) = lab G,s (x) be the labeling of the graph G with input x using the CRHF, H (see Definition 3.1).
• Let
• The codeword c consists of the encoding of groups of message bits, followed by encoding using ECC of groups of labels, followed by t = k ′ m copies of the last encoding.
where
The codeword c = Enc(x) consists of 3 parts. The first k/R bits correspond to the message symbols x passed m · βℓ(λ) bits at a time through ECC of rate R. The next k/(βR) bits correspond to t codewords ECC(U j ), and finally the last k/(βR) bits correspond to the repetitions of the final ECC codeword, ECC(U t ). Therefore the length of any codeword produced by Enc is n = k R · β+2 β . The information rate of the constructed code is therefore R · β β+2 . Therefore appropriately choosing the parameters β and R, we get the rate of the CRLCC approaching 1.
Strong CRLCC Decoder: We can show that for any w ∈ {0, 1} n with dist(w, c) ≤
the number of tampered meta-nodes T ⊂ V (G 0 ) is very small. If let t(τ ) denote the maximum number of meta-nodes v that the attacker can either corrupt or ensure that v is not α-good with respect to T then it can be shown that t(τ )/t → 0 as τ → 0 i.e., almost all of the meta-nodes u are α-good with respect to the set T of tampered meta-nodes and that any such node u that has 2δ-local expansion in the green subgraph G g . We also show that any meta-node v < t − t(τ ) − 1 that has δ ′ -local expansion with δ ′ ≤ 4δ must also be correct because at least one of the last t(τ ) + 1 nodes must be α-good and correct and v will be connected to this node via an all green path since we have 4δ-local expansion around both nodes in the green subgraph G g . While the set T is potentially unknown it is possible to test which (with high probability) accepts all α-good meta-nodes and (with high probability) rejects any meta-node u with the property that the green subgraph G g does not have 4δ-local expansion around u. We can distinguish between the two cases by strategically sampling edges in each of the intervals A i = 
A Expanded Discussion of Related Work
Classical LDCs/LCCs and Relaxed Variants in the Hamming channel The current best constructions for LDCs/LCCs can achieve any constant rate R < 1, any constant relative distance (i.e., minimum Hamming distance between codewords) δ < 1 − R, and query complexity O 2 √ log n log log n [KMRS17] . In the constant query complexity regime, for q ≥ 3, the best codes Non-Local Codes in Computationally Bounded Channels In their initial works in the computationally bounded channel, Lipton [Lip94] and Ding, Gopalan and Lipton [DGL04] obtain error-correcting codes uniquely decodable (in the classical, global setting) with error rates beyond what is possible in the adversarial Hamming channel. Their model requires that the sender and receiver share a secret random string, unknown to the channel. This is a strong cryptographic assumption, as the model is unsuitable to common settings such as message broadcast. Micali et al. [MPSW05] address this drawback by proposing public-key error-correcting codes against computationally bounded channels. Their model is based on the observation that if one starts with a code that is list-decodable, by encoding messages using a secret key and digitally signing them, one can prevent a PPT channel from producing valid signatures, while allowing the receiver to pick the unique message from the list with a valid signature. In follow-up work, Guruswami and Smith
[GS16] removes the public-key setup, and obtains optimal rate error-correcting codes for channels that can be described by simple circuits. Their channels are either "oblivious", namely the error is independent of the actual message being sent, or they are describable by polynomial size circuits. Their results are based on the idea that the sender can choose a permutation and a "blinding factor" that are then embedded into the codeword together with the message. The channel cannot distinguish the hidden information since it operates with low complexity, while the receiver can.
LDCs in Computationally Bounded Channels The notion of LDCs over computationally bounded channels was introduced in [OPS07] , where the authors define private LDCs. In these constructions the sender and the receiver share a private key. They obtain codes of constant rate and O (polylog λ) query complexity, where λ is the security parameter. Hemenway and Ostrovsky [HO08] build LDCs in the public-key model, and obtain codes of constant rate, and O λ 2 locality. Hemenway et al.
[HOSW11] improve on these results and obtain public-key LDCs with constant rate, constant error rate and O (λ) locality, which work under a weaker cryptographic assumption than that of [HO08].
Other Applications of Depth-Robust Graphs Depth-robust graphs have found many applications in cryptography. These applications includes the construction of memory hard functions with provably high cumulative memory complexity [AS15, AB16, ABP17, ABH17, BZ17], sustained space complexity [ABP18] and bandwidth hardness [BRZ18, RD17] . Depth robust graphs have also been used to construct proofs of space [DFKP15] and they were also used in the first construction of a proof of sequential work [MMV13] although Cohen and Pietrzak [CP18] found an alternate construction of a Proofs-Of-Sequential Work protocol that does not involve depth-robust graphs. Finally, depth-robust graphs have also been used to derive cumulative space in the black-white pebble game [AdNV17, ABP18] which is of interest in the study of proof complexity. To the best of our knowledge we are the first to apply depth-robust graphs (more specifically δ-local expanders) in the area of coding theory to construct (relaxed) locally correctable codes.
B Additional Background: Justesen Codes, CRHFs and Local Expanders
We use the notation [n] to represent the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. For any x, y ∈ Σ n , let dist(x) denote the Hamming weight of x, i.e. the number of non-zero coordinates of x. Let dist(x, y) = dist(x − y) denote the Hamming distance between the vectors x and y. For any vector x ∈ Σ n , let x[i] be the i th coordinate of x. We also let x • y denote the concatenation of x with y. We denote a directed acyclic graph G with n vertices labelled in topological order by G = ([n], E). A node v ∈ V has indegree δ = indeg(v) if there exist δ incoming edges δ = |(V × {v})∩ E|. Thus, we say that graph G has indegree δ = indeg(G) if the maximum indegree of any node of G is δ. A node with indegree 0 is called a source node and a node with no outgoing edges is called a sink. A node v ∈ V has outdegree δ = outdeg(v) if there exist δ outgoing edges δ = |(V × {v}) ∩ E|. Thus, we say that graph G has outdegree δ = outdeg(G) if the maximum outdegree of any node of G is δ. Finally, we say that graph G has degree δ = deg(G) if the maximum degree of any node of G is δ, or equivalently max v∈V outdeg(v)+ indeg(v) = δ. We use parents G (v) = {u ∈ V : (u, v) ∈ E} to denote the parents of a node v ∈ V . We will often consider graphs obtained from other graphs by removing subsets of nodes. Therefore if S ⊂ V , then we denote by G − S the DAG obtained from G by removing nodes S and incident edges.
Let C be a (n, k) code that maps any k-length message over alphabet Σ to a unique n-length codeword over alphabet Σ. We say n is the block length of the code, and k/n is the information rate. Let Enc : Σ k → Σ n denote the encoding map of C. We define the minimum distance of C to be the quantity min c 1 ,c 2 ∈C dist(c 1 , c 2 ) and the relative minimum distance of C to be the quantity min c 1 ,c 2 ∈C dist(c 1 ,c 2 ) n . We shall use Enc and Dec to refer to the encoding and decoding algorithms of our construction, and ECC and ECCD to refer to the encoding and decoding algorithms for a binary code C J with constant rate and relative distance. We will use Justesen codes [Jus72] in what follows. 
Collision Resistant Hash Functions (CRHF)
Our code constructions involve the use of collision-resistant hash functions. We use the following definitions from Katz and Lindell [KL14].
Definition B.2 [KL14, Definition 4.11] A hash function with alphabet Σ and blocklength ℓ(.) is a pair Π = (GenH, H) of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms satisfying:
• GenH is a probabilistic algorithm which takes as input a security parameter 1 λ and outputs a public seed s ∈ {0, 1} * , where the security parameter 1 λ is implicit in the string s.
• H is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a seed s and a string Σ * and outputs a string H(s, x) ∈ Σ ℓ(λ) .
A collision resistant hash function can be defined using the following experiment for a hash function Π = (GenH, H), an adversary A, and a security parameter λ:
The collision-finding experiment Hash − coll A,Π (λ): 
Background on δ-Local Expander Graphs
We now begin to describe the underlying DAGs in our code construction. We first define the class of graphs δ-expanders and δ-local expanders.
Definition B.5 Let δ > 0 and G = ([n], E) be a directed acyclic graph. G is called a δ-local expander if for every vertex x ∈ [n] and every r ≤ min{x, n − x}, the bipartite graph induced by U = [x, . . . , x + r − 1] and V = [x + r, . . . , x + 2r − 1] is a δ-expander.
Theorem B.6, due to Alwen et al. [ABP18] , states that δ-local expanders exist with degree O (log n).
Theorem B.6 [ABP18] For any n > 0, δ > 0, there exists a δ-local expander G = ([n], E) with indegree O (log n) and outdegree O (log n).
The construction of Alwen et al. [ABP18] is probabilistic.
In particular, they show that there is a random distribution over DAGs such that any sample from this distribution is a δ-local expander with high probability. The randomized construction of Alwen et al. [ABP18] closely follows an earlier construction of Erdos et al.
[EGS75] 5 . We now list some properties of the δ-local expander graphs shown in [ABP18] . We will use these properties to construct the Dec algorithm for the CRLCC scheme.
Definition B.7 (α-good node) Let G = ([n], E) be a DAG and let S ⊆ [n] be a subset of vertices.
Let 0 < c < 1. We say v ∈ [n] − S is α-good under S if for all r > 0:
Intuitively, we can view the subset S to be a set of "deleted" vertices. A vertex in the remaining graph is called α-good if at most α fraction of vertices in any of its neighborhood are contained in the deleted set. In our case, we will ultimately define S to be the nodes with the inconsistent labels.
The following result of [ABP18] shows that in any DAG G, even if we deleted a constant fraction of vertices, there still remain a constant fraction of vertices that are α-good. Claim B.9 rephrases a claim from [ABP18] . The only difference is that [ABP18] did not define the phrase "G is a δ-local expander around node x" since the DAG G they consider is assumed to satisfy this property for all nodes x. However, their proof only relies on the fact that G is a δ-local expander around node x.
Claim B.9 ([ABP18]) Let G = (V = [n]
, E) be a δ-local expander around x and suppose that x ∈ [n] is a α-good node under S ⊆ [n]. Let r > 0 be given. If α < γ/2 then all but 2δr of the nodes in I * r (x)\S are reachable from x in G − S. Similarly, x can be reached from all but 2δr of the nodes in I r (x)\S. In particular, if δ < 1/4 then more than half of the nodes in I * r (x)\S (resp. in I r (x) \ S) are reachable from x (resp. x is reachable from) in G − S.
Alwen et al. [ABP18] also show that in a δ-local expander graph G any two α-good vertices in G − S are connected. As was the case for Claim B.9 the only difference between our statement of Lemma B.10 and [ABP18] is that [ABP18] did not define the phrase "G is a δ-local expander around node x" since the DAG G they consider is assumed to satisfy this property for all nodes x. However, their proof only relies on the fact that G is a δ-local expander around nodes u and v. In this section, we describe the procedure for recovering a coordinate for input i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ). We show that regardless of the underlying graph, any adversary that can change at most
coordinates of a codeword obtained from Enc, cannot prevent outputting ⊥ or the correct bit for a query on the last k ′ + 1 blocks. Consider the following algorithm Dec (1) Sample Θ log 3 k ℓ(λ) blocks {w t } of w for t between 2k ′ and 3k ′ uniformly at random.
(2) Decode each of the queried blocks w t to the corrected codeword, c t := ECC(ECCD(w t )).
(could possibly be a ⊥ if ECCD fails to decode).
(3) Let c maj = majority{c t } be the codeword of ECC which occurs majority of the times in
Step (2) above.
(4) Output symbol (i mod 4ℓ(λ)) of c maj .
We show in Lemma C.1 that Pr [Dec
and uses at most O log 3 n queries.
Lemma C.1 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any 8k − 4ℓ(λ) ≤ i ≤ n, Dec w 1 does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k and c = Enc(s, x), it holds that Dec (2) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k , c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1} n generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤
Moreover, Dec w 1 makes at most O log 3 n queries to w.
Proof : First, note that for any codeword obtained from Enc, Dec 1 will always output the correct symbol. Let w be the received word which is obtained by altering at most . Then by standard Chernoff bounds, the probability that the majority of the Θ
queries are correct is at least 1 − e −Ω(ns) , where
is the number of sampled blocks.
blocks each of length 4ℓ(λ) bits, the complexity of Dec 1 is at most
C.2 Query Procedure for i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ)
In this section, we describe the algorithm for recovering a coordinate for input i < 8k−4ℓ(λ). Before we describe the algorithm, we need a few definitions and properties of the code we constructed in Section 3.1.
Recall that for a codeword obtained from Enc, the first k ′ blocks of length 4ℓ(λ) each, corresponds to the encoding of the message symbols, and the next k ′ blocks correspond to the encoding of labels of the nodes of a fixed δ-local expander graph G = ([k ′ ], E) generated using the k ′ message blocks.
Recall that we say that a node v is green if it is locally consistent with the hash of its parents. In the next lemma, we describe an algorithm which verifies whether a given node of G is green with respect to the labels obtained from the received vector w ∈ {0, 1} n . From the definition of a green node it follows that we need to query only the labels of the parents of a given vertex v to verify if it is green. Since the indegree of G is O (log k ′ ), we can check if a particular node is green by making at most O (log k ′ ) block queries to w. We now formalize the verification procedure.
, E) be δ-local expander with indegree O (log k ′ ) used by Enc and let w = (w 1 , . . . , w 3k ′ ) ∈ {0, 1} n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists an algorithm IsGreen that uses O (ℓ(λ) log (n/ℓ(λ))) coordinate queries to w and outputs whether a given node v ∈ [k ′ ] of G is green or not.
Proof : We claim the following algorithm achieves the desired properties:
(1) Query and decode the blocks
Return 'Red' if ECCD fails on any input.
(2) Query and decode the block w v . Let x ′ v := ECCD(w v ). Return 'Red' if ECCD fails.
IsGreen outputs whether or not the label of node v, i.e. ECCD(w k ′ +v ), is green by querying at most O (log k ′ ) blocks of w. Since each block is 4ℓ(λ) bits long, and k ′ = k/ℓ(λ) = O (n/ℓ(λ)), the number of bits queried is equivalently O (ℓ(λ) log (n/ℓ(λ))).
Let w ∈ {0, 1} n be the received word obtained from the PPT adversary. Let S ⊆ [k ′ ] be the set of red nodes of G with respect to its labeling obtained from w. Let 0 < α < 1. Recall from Definition B.7 that we call a node i ∈ [k ′ ] of G to be α-good under the set S ⊆ [k ′ ] if for all r > 0, the number of nodes of S in any r-sized neighborhood of i is at most α·r. We now give an algorithm to locally verify if a given node of G is α-good with high probability. • Accepts if i is α 4 -good under S with probability 1 − negl(n).
• Rejects if i is not α-good under S with probability 1 − negl(n).
Proof : Consider the following algorithm IsGood, where S is defined to be the set of red nodes:
(1) If i is not green, then Reject.
(2) For every p ∈ {1, . . . , log k ′ } do:
• If the fraction of red nodes in U 1p or U 2p is larger than 3α 8 , then Reject.
(3) Accept otherwise.
Note that IsGood samples at most O log 2+ǫ k ′ nodes of G and for each of those nodes, we check if it is green. Using Algorithm IsGreen described in Lemma C.2, we can verify if a node is green using only O (log k ′ ) block queries to w. Therefore the number of coordinates of w queried by IsGood is at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) . To prove the correctness, first observe that if the node i is red, then i ∈ S and therefore by definition it is not α-good for any α. IsGood always rejects such nodes.
Suppose node i is α/4-good. Then any r-sized neighborhoods of i, i.e [i− r + 1, i] and [i, i+ r − 1] have at most α·r/4 red nodes. In particular, for all p ∈ [log k ′ ], the neighborhoods U 1p = [i−2 p +1, i] and U 2p = [i, i + 2 p − 1] contain at most α/4 fraction of red nodes. So, on sampling uniformly random log 1+ǫ k ′ vertices from these intervals, the probability that we see more than 3α/8 fraction of red nodes is at most e − α 12 log 1+ǫ k ′ which follows from Chernoff bounds. Taking a union bound over all log k ′ intervals, IsGood accepts any α/4-good node with probability at least 1 − e
Therefore IsGood accepts any α/4-good node with probability at least 1 − negl(k ′ ) = 1 − negl(n) for ℓ(λ) = polylog n. In order to show that the algorithm rejects any node which is not α-good with high probability, we first show that any node which is not α-good under S is not α/2-good for some interval of size 2 p , p > 0. The rejection probability then follows from Chernoff bounds. If node i is not α-good under S, then there exists a neighborhood I of i such that the number of red nodes in I is at least α|I|. Let R(X) denote the number of red nodes for some subset X ⊆ V . Let U 1 ⊆ I ⊆ U 2 where |U 1 | = 2 p * and |U 2 | = 2 p * +1 for some integer p * > 0. Then
where the inequality (*) results from i not being α-good. So, the probability that this interval goes undetected by IsGood is at most e − α 32 log 1+ǫ k ′ . Therefore, IsGood rejects any node which is not α-good with probability at least 1 − negl(k ′ ). Now, we describe the decoding procedure for any index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ) using the IsGood procedure. Let (w, i, x) be the challenge provided by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤ τ , where c = Enc(x).
Recall from the encoding procedure in , the first 8k − 4ℓ(λ) bits correspond to either the the encoding of the message bits using ECC (the first 4k bits) or the encoding of the labels of the nodes the δ-local expander (the next 4k bits). For any index query corresponding to the encoding of the label bits (i > 4k), we check if the label is tampered with or not. If it is not tampered, then the decoder returns the received bit, else it returns a ⊥. For any i ≤ 4k, the decoder first tests if its corresponding label is tampered. If it is not tampered, then the decoder returns the corresponding received bit, else it returns a ⊥.
Recall that using Algorithm Dec 1 we can successfully correct any index i ≥ 8k−4ℓ(λ). Therefore, to design Dec 2 , we assume the correctness of node k ′ using Dec 1 . The procedure Dec 2 first checks whether nodes i and node k ′ are α-good for some α < 3/4. If they are both α-good, then by Lemma B.10 there is a path of green nodes connecting i and node k ′ . Node k ′ now serves as an anchor point by being both α-good and correct due to the repetition code, so then Lemma 3.3 implies node i is also unaltered. We now formalize this and describe Dec 2 in Lemma C.4.
Lemma C.4 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any 1 ≤ i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ), there exists a procedure Dec 2 with the following properties:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k and c = Enc(s, x), Dec (2) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k , c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1} n generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤
Moreover, Dec 2 makes at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) queries to input w for any constant ǫ > 0.
Proof : We claim the following procedure has the desired properties.
Dec w 2 : Input: Index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ).
(1) Let S be the set of red nodes of G with respect to the labels obtained from w.
(2) Let α < 3 4 .
(3) Reconstruct the label of k ′ -th node, ℓ k ′ ,s using a call to Dec 1 .
(4) If node k ′ of G with label ℓ k ′ ,s and node
First we show that the query complexity of Dec 2 is at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) . Observe that Dec 1 described in Lemma C.1 uses majority decoding to reconstruct the entire block w 2k ′ +j , for any 0 ≤ j ≤ k ′ − 1. Moreover, it uses at most O log 3 n coordinate queries to w in order to reconstruct any of the last k ′ blocks with 1 − negl(n). Therefore we can assume that after Step (3), the label ℓ k ′ ,s of G is correct with very high probability. Also, using the procedure described in Lemma C.3, we can check if both the nodes k ′ and i are α-good using at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) queries for any ǫ > 0. Therefore the query complexity of Dec 2 is O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) . To show (1), observe that if w is a codeword produced by Enc, then the label ℓ k ′ ,s is reconstructed correctly with probability 1 by Dec 1 in the first step. Also since S = ∅, all the nodes of G are α-good. Therefore, Dec 2 always returns the correct codeword symbol. Now, if w is any string produced by a PPT adversary such that 0 < dist(c, w) ≤ ∆ J k 4 , then from the analysis of Dec 1 in Lemma C.1, we know that ℓ k ′ ,s is reconstructed correctly with probability at least 1 − negl(n). If both nodes i and k ′ of G are α-good under S, then by Lemma B.10, we know that there exists a path in G from node i to node k ′ in G which consists of only green nodes. So, node i is a green ancestor of node k ′ . The correctness of w i then follows from Lemma 3.3.
We now combine the two correctors described above to obtain our local corrector Dec as follows:
Lemma C.5 Let Enc be as described in Section 3.1. For any i ∈ [n], Dec does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k and c = Enc(s,
(2) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k , c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1} n generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤
Moreover, Dec makes at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) queries to input w for any constant ǫ > 0.
Proof :
The proof follows from Lemma C.4 and Lemma C.1. Since n = 3k ′ · 4ℓ(λ), any query on an index i < 8k − 4ℓ(λ) is handled by Lemma C.4 while a query on an index i ≥ 8k − 4ℓ(λ) is handled by Lemma C.1. Since each scenario uses at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) queries, the algorithm also uses O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ (n/ℓ(λ)) queries. Note that for ℓ(λ) = polylog n, the query complexity of the decoder is polylog n.
We now show that our construction Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a CRLCC scheme.
Proof of Theorem 2.4: Gen on input a security parameter λ simulates the generator algorithm GenH of the CRHF to output a random seed s.
Consider s ← Gen(1 λ ), Enc described in Section 3.1 and the decoder Dec described in Section 3.2 above. We claim that the triple Π = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a CRLCC scheme.
From the construction of Enc, we know that the block length of a codeword produced by Enc is n = 3k ′ · 4 · ℓ(λ) = 12k. Therefore, the information rate of the CRLCC is O (1).
From Lemma C.5 we know that on input (w, i, x) generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(Enc(x), w) ≤
coordinates of w and returns d ∈ {Enc(x)[i], ⊥} with probability at least 1 − negl(n). Also, Dec on input any valid encoding (Enc(x), i, x) returns Enc(x)[i] with probability 1.
D Strong CRLCC Decoder
Recall that the codeword c = Enc(x) consists of 3 parts of t blocks each. The first k/R bits (first t blocks) correspond to the message symbols x passed m · βℓ(λ) bits at a time through ECC of rate R. The next k/(βR) bits (second set of t blocks) correspond to t codewords ECC(U j ), and finally the last k/(βR) bits (third set of t blocks) correspond to the repetitions of the final ECC codeword, ECC(U t ). Note: For simplicity of presentation, we let β = 1 and R = 1/4 for the discussion of the decoder in this section. The proof extends similarly for other values of the parameters β and R.
Observe that at the end of the construction, each meta-node contains exactly one node (i.e. the final node) with indegree more than 2 (it has indegree m) and outdegree more than 2 (it has outdegree O (m)).
Similar to the decoder Dec of Section 3.2, the current decoding procedure has separate subroutine to handle indices corresponding to the first 2t − 1 blocks and a separate decoding procedure for the remaining indices. In the following, we define map(i) to be the meta-node corresponding to index i. That is,
Before we describe the decoder for the Strong CRLCC, we need a few definitions and supporting lemmas.
The following claim follows from the construction of the metagraph G 0 which was shown in [ABP18] . The bounded outdegree allows us to test meta-nodes with a bounded (in this case logarithmic) number of queries.
. We note that if c ′ i and c i are sufficiently close then we will always havec i = c i . Ifc i = c i we say that the block i was tampered and ifc i = c i we say that the block is correct. We let T ⊆ [t − 1] denote the set of all nodes u < t (excluding the last node t) with the property that either blocks u or u + t were tampered. We also let ℓ ′ u 1 ,s • . . .
• ℓ ′ um,s = ECCD(c u+t ) and x (u−1)m+1 • . . . • x um = ECCD(c u ). We say that a node u i ∈ V (G) with parents(u i ) =
i.e., the given label of node u i is consistent with the labeling rule given the data value x (u−1)m+i and the given labels of u i 's parents. We say that an edge (u m , v i ) ∈ E(G) is green if both u m and v i are green.
Definition D.2
We call a meta-node u ∈ V (G 0 ) green if both:
• At least 2 3 fraction of the corresponding nodes u 1 , . . . , u m ∈ V (G) are are green.
• The final node u m in the meta-node is also green.
We call a meta-node red if the meta-node is not green. Similarly, we call a meta-node u correct if we are able to correctly decode the blocks c u and c u+t .
We stress that a red meta-node is not necessarily tampered nor is a green meta-node necessarily correct.
D.1 Query Procedure for map(i) = t
In the case that map(i) = t, we run a procedure Dec (2) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k , c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1} n generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤
Moreover, Dec w =t makes at most O ℓ(λ) · log 2+ǫ n coordinate queries to input w.
Proof : Consider the following algorithm Dec (1) Sample (with replacement) s := O log 1+ǫ n blocks {ỹ 1 , . . . ,ỹ s } each of length 4mℓ(λ) from the last t blocks.
(2) Let y j = ECC(ECCD(ỹ j )) for every j ∈ [s] to correct each of the sampled blocks.
(3) Output majority of {y j,î | j ∈ [s]}, whereî = i (mod 4mℓ(λ)) and y j,î is theî-th coordinate in y j .
First, note that for any codeword obtained from Enc, Dec =t will always output the correct symbol. Let w be received word which is obtained by altering at most Since we query blocks uniformly at random, each query finds a block with large corruption with probability at most 1 4κ . Therefore, the probability that majority of the queried blocks are corrupted beyond repair is at most 1 4κ s/2 = negl(n), for s = O log 1+ǫ n . Since Dec =t queries O log 1+ǫ n blocks each of length 4m · ℓ(λ) and m = O (log n), then at most O ℓ(λ) · log 2+ǫ n queries are made in total.
D.2 Query Procedure for map(i) < t
Recall from the construction that G 0 is the metagraph of G. We define the green subgraph of G 0 to be the subgraph consisting of exactly the edges whose endpoints in G are both green nodes. We show there exists an efficient procedure to check whether an edge is in the green subgraph, which we shall use to determine if nodes in G have δ-local expansion in the green subgraph. If there is local expansion around nodes u and v in the green subgraph, then without loss of generality, there exists a path from u to v that only consists of green nodes by Lemma D.14. Hence if v is correct, then we show in Lemma D.16 that either u is also correct, or a hash collision has been found. Nevertheless, this procedure is vacuous if there is a low number of nodes u, v with local expansion in the green subgraph. To address this concern, we show in Lemma D.12 that for a specific range of α, if a node u is α-good with respect to a tampered set, then there must also be 2δ-local expansion around u in the green subgraph.
In this section, we design the corrector for indices i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t.
Recall that we call a meta-node green if most of its nodes including the final node are green. First, we claim the existence of a procedure to test whether a meta-node is green.
Lemma D.4 Let G 0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w 1 , · · · , w 3t ) ∈ {0, 1} n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsGreenMeta that uses O ℓ(λ) · log 2 n coordinate queries to w and checks whether a meta-node u of G 0 with labels corresponding to w is green.
Proof : We claim the following procedure satisfies the desired properties:
IsGreenMeta(u, w): Input : Meta-node index u ∈ [t], corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1} n (1) Check if the final node in meta-node u is green:
• Query coordinates of w t+u and retrieve (ℓ ′ u 1 , . . . , ℓ ′ um ) := ECCD(w t+u ).
• Query the coordinates of w u and retrieve (x ′ u 1 , . . . , x ′ um ) := ECCD(w u ).
for the final node u m in meta-node u, where u 1 , . . . , u m−1 are the parents of u m , which are all in meta-node u.
• If ℓ ′ um is not consistent, then output 'Red'.
(2) For each node u j in meta-node u, check whether u j is green:
• Let u j−1 (in meta-node u) and p r (r-th node in some meta-node p) be the parents of u j .
• Query w t+p and retrieve ℓ ′ pr using ECCD(w t+p ). Recall from Definition D.2 that a green meta-node first requires that at least 2 3 of the underlying nodes in meta-node u are green. Since a node is green if its label is consistent with the labels of its parents, then the procedure IsGreenMeta properly recognizes whether at least 2 3 of the underlying nodes in u are green after decoding using ECCD. Secondly, a green meta-node requires that the final node in u is green. In this case, the final node u m has m − 1 parents, and again the procedure recognizes whether
) after obtaining the labels using ECCD. Observe that in Step (1), we query two blocks of w each of length 4mℓ(λ) bits. Also, in
Step (2), for each of the m − 1 nodes u j in the meta-node u we query one additional block of w corresponding to the parent meta-node of u j . Since each block is of length 4mℓ(λ) bits long, the total query complexity is O m 2 ℓ(λ) = O ℓ(λ) · log 2 n for m = O (log n).
We now define the notion of a green edge in the meta-graph G 0 . Let u and v be meta-nodes which are connected in G 0 . From the construction of the degree reduced graph G, we know that there exists an edge from the m-th node of the meta-node u to some node v u of the meta-node v. We say that an edge from meta-node u to meta-node v is green if the corresponding end points in G are green, i.e., the node u m of meta-node u and the node v u in meta-node v are green. We say an edge is red if it is not green. Note that it is possible for the end node v u to be red even if the meta-node v is green.
Given any w ∈ {0, 1} n , we now describe a procedure IsGreenEdge(u, v, w) which locally verifies whether a given edge (u, v) of G 0 is green or not.
Lemma D.5 Let G 0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w 1 , · · · , w 3t ) ∈ {0, 1} n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsGreenEdge that makes O (ℓ(λ) log(n)) coordinate queries to w and checks whether an edge (u, v) of G 0 with labels corresponding to w is green.
Proof :
IsGreenEdge(u, v, w): Input : Meta graph edge (u, v), corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1} n (1) Check if the final node in meta-node u is green:
• If ℓ ′ um is not consistent, then output 'Red' edge.
(2) Check if the node v u in meta-node v is green:
• Query coordinates of w t+v and retrieve (ℓ ′ v 1 , . . . , ℓ ′ vm ) := ECCD(w t+v ).
• Query the coordinates of w v and retrieve (
(3) Output 'Green' edge.
The procedure IsGreenEdge first checks if the node u m of meta-node u is green, and then checks if the connecting node v u of meta-node v is green. The correctness of IsGreenEdge then follows from the definition. Note that checks (1) and (2) both query 2 blocks of w, each of length 4mℓ(λ). Hence the query complexity of the IsGreenEdge is O (mℓ(λ)) = O (ℓ(λ) log(n)), for m = O (log(n)).
Using the definition of a green edge, we now define a green subgraph of G 0 and the notion of local expansion which is an essential ingredient to describe the decoder. Definition D.6 The green subgraph of G 0 , denoted by G g , is the subgraph of G 0 that contains all green edges of G 0 .
Definition D.7 We say that a DAG G has δ-local expansion around a node v ∈ V if for all r: Recall that we say that a DAG G is a δ-local expander if all nodes v ∈ V have δ-local expansion. A key step in designing the decoder is to verify whether G g has local expansion property around some given meta-node. Before describe the verification procedure and why it is necessary, we introduce notations and list some important properties of the meta-graph G 0 and its green subgraph G g . Let u be any meta-node of G 0 . Let A u,r := [u, u + r − 1] and B u,r := [u + r, u + 2r − 1] and r < 1 2 (t − u), then from the definition of a δ-local expander, we know that G 0 contains δ-expander between A u,r and B u,r . Let us denote this subgraph by H u,r , i.e., H u,r = (A u,r ∪ B u,r , (A u,r × B u,r ) ∩ E). We assume the following property of G 0 . Define H u,r g to be the green subgraph of H u,r , i.e., the subgraph of H u,r restricted to G g . Lemma D.9 Let n r be the number of red edges in H u,r . If H u,r g is not a 4δ-expander, then n r ≥ 3δr.
If Using the key observation described above, we now give an efficient procedure to verify if the green meta-graph G g has 4δ-local expansion around a given meta-node u. The idea is to estimate the number of red edges in increasing intervals around the given meta-node and reject if this estimate is large for any interval.
Lemma D.11 Let G 0 be the meta-graph with t vertices used by Enc and let w = (w 1 , · · · , w 3t ) ∈ {0, 1} n be the corrupted word obtained from the PPT adversary. There exists a procedure IsLocalExpander that makes O mℓ(λ) log 2+ǫ t coordinate queries to w and rejects any meta-node u around which G g does not have 4δ-local expansion with probability 1 − negl(n).
Proof : Consider the following algorithm IsLocalExpander:
IsLocalExpander(u, w, δ): Input : Green meta node u, corrupted codeword w ∈ {0, 1} n (1) For every p ∈ {1, . . . , log t}:
• Consider a bipartite expander H u,2 p , with node sets
• Randomly sample s := log 1+ǫ t edges from the subgraph with replacement.
• Count the number of red edges in the sample.
• If the number of red edges in the sample is larger than 5 2 δs, then 'Reject'. • Consider a bipartite expander H ′ u,2 p with node sets
• If the number of red edges in the sample is larger than 5 2 δs, then 'Reject'.
(2) Accept otherwise.
Note that IsLocalExpander calls the procedure IsGreenEdge for every sampled edge to check whether it is red or green. Each call to IsGreenEdge requires O (mℓ(λ)) coordinate queries to w. The total number of calls to IsGreenEdge is at most 2 log 2+ǫ t since we sample at most log 1+ǫ t distinct edges from each of the log t subgraph H u,2 p . Therefore, the total query complexity of IsLocalExpander is upper bounded by O (mℓ(λ)) log 2+ǫ t. Suppose u is a meta-node around which G g does not have 4δ-local expansion. Then there exists a fixed node set [u, u + 2 p − 1] and [u + 2 p , u + 2 p+1 − 1] whose corresponding subgraph has at least 3δ2 p red edges, by Lemma D.9. Therefore on sampling uniformly at random with replacement, we expect to see at least 3δs red edges. So the probability that we see at most 5 2 δs red edges is at most exp(−O log 1+ǫ t ), from standard Chernoff bounds. Note that we accept u if we see at most 5 2 δs red edges in all the 2 log t intervals. By taking union bound the probability that we accept a meta-node around which G g does not have 4δ-expansion is at most
. Now, we list some key properties of the meta-nodes around which G g has local expansion. These properties are important to understand why we needed the local expansion verification procedure. Essentially we show that if any meta-node is α-good under the set of tampered meta-nodes, then G g has 2δ-local expansion about it (for appropriately chosen value of α). Then we show that any two meta-nodes around which G g has local expansion are connected by a path of green nodes in G. Now similar to the weak CRLCC decoder, we can argue about the correctness of any ancestor of a correct node in a green path (unless the adversary finds a hash collision).
Recall that we call a meta-node u to be α-good under the T if every interval for every interval [u, u + r − 1] ∩ T ≤ αr. We see that if a meta-node u is α-good under T , then G g has 2δ-local expansion around u.
Lemma D.12 Let u be a meta-node that is α-good with respect to T . Then there is 2δ-local expansion around u in G g for any α < Moreover, we see that the number of red edges in the 2δ-expander is at most 3αrd δ .
Lemma D.13 If u is a meta-node that is α-good under T , then for any r > 0 the number of red edges in between the intervals [u, u + r − 1] and [u + r, u + 2r − 1] is at most 3αrd δ .
Proof : Since u is α-good under T , the intervals A := [u, u + r − 1] and B := [u + r, u + 2r − 1] contain at most αr and 2αr tampered nodes respectively. Since we assumed that the δ-expander contained in A and B has constant degree d δ , the number of red edges is upper bounded by 3αrd δ .
So in order to ensure that this number is not too large (for IsLocalExpander to succeed), we choose α such that 3αrd δ ≪ 3δr. This guarantees that the procedure IsLocalExpander definitely accepts nodes that are α-good under T .
We now show that any two meta-nodes with local expansion property are connected by a path of green edges in G g . This also ensures that the corresponding nodes are connected by a path of green nodes in the underlying graph G.
Lemma D.14 If G g has 4δ-local expansion around the meta nodes u and v, then there exists a path from u to v in G g .
Let r be such that v = u + 2r − 1. Consider the 4δ expander between A := [u, u + r − 1] and B := [u + r, u + 2r − 1]. We show using Claim D.15 that u is connected to at least 4δr meta-nodes in A, and similarly v is reachable from at least 4δr meta-nodes in B. Now since G g has 4δ expansion around u, there exists an edge between any two large enough subset of nodes of A and B. Hence, the set of nodes reachable to u in A are connected to the set of nodes which are reachable from v in B.
It now remains to show that u and v are connected to at least 4δr meta-nodes in A and B respectively. Let i be such that 2 i ≤ r < 2 i+1 . From Claim D.15, we get that u is connected to at least Lemma D.16 Suppose there exists a path from meta-node u to v in the green subgraph G g . If v is untampered (correct), then either u is also untampered or the adversary has found a hash collision.
Proof : The proof of this lemma follows from the proof of Lemma 3.3 once we show that there exists a path in G with all green nodes from any node in the meta-node u to some node in the meta-node v.
Consider the path from meta-nodes u to v in G g . Any two adjacent edges (p, q) and (q, r) in (u, v) path in G g corresponds to the edge from the last node p m of p to some node q i (i < m) of meta-node q, and an edge from the last node q m of q to some node r j (j < m) of meta-node r. Since these edges are green, we know that the nodes p i , p m and q j are green. Now, from the construction of the graph G, we conclude that there is an edge from p i to p m . Therefore, there is a path in G from any node in the meta-node u to some node in the meta-node v with all green nodes.
Equipped with all the necessary procedures, we now present the decoder for the Strong CRLCC for any coordinate query i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t. (1) Use IsLocalExpander to verify if G g has 4δ-local expansion around u. • Use Dec w =t (w, j) for all 8tmℓ(λ) − 4mℓ(λ) ≤ j < 8tmℓ(λ) to reconstruct the last block w 2t .
• If G g has 4δ-local expansion around t using the constructed labeling, then return w i , else return ⊥.
(3) If IsLocalExpander rejects u, then return ⊥.
Lemma D.17 Let Enc be as described in Section 4.1. For any i ∈ [n] such that map(i) < t, Dec <t does the following:
(1) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k and c = Enc(s, x), Dec (2) For any x ∈ {0, 1} k , c = Enc(s, x) and w ∈ {0, 1} n generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(c, w) ≤ Moreover, Dec w <t makes at most O ℓ(λ) log 3+ǫ n queries to input w.
Before we prove the correctness of Lemma D.17, we show that any PPT adversary that generates a corrupted codeword w such that dist(w, c) ≤ ∆ j k κ , cannot manage to corrupt many meta-nodes. Let T denote the set of tampered meta-nodes of G 0 .
Lemma D.18 Let w ∈ {0, 1} n be a corrupted codeword generated by any PPT adversary such that dist(w, C) ≤ ∆ j k κ , then at most t 4κ meta-nodes are tampered.
We first observe that a meta-node can only be altered beyond repair by changing at least 4m · ℓ(λ) · ∆ J bits. Therefore, by changing at most Query Complexity: The query complexity of the decoder is dominated by the query complexity of IsLocalExpander. From Lemma D.11, it then follows that the query complexity of Dec w <t is at most O mℓ(λ) log 2+ǫ t = O mℓ(λ) log 2+ǫ n for m = O (log n). Correctness (1): If w ∈ C, then the green graph G g = G 0 and hence, G g has δ expansion around all meta-nodes u. Also, since T = ∅, all meta-nodes are α-good in G 0 with respect to T . Therefore, Dec <t accepts a codeword with probability 1.
Correctness (2): Now, let w be a corrupted codeword such that dist(d, c) ≤
E Computationally Relaxed Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC)
In this section of the appendix we present the formal definition of a Computationally Relaxed Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC) -defined informally in the main body of the paper. We first tweak the definition of a local code so that local decoding algorithm takes as input an index from the range i ∈ [k] instead of i ∈ [n] i.e., the goal is to decode a bit of the original message as opposed to a bit of the original codeword.
Definition E.1 A local code is a tuple (Gen, Enc, Dec) of probabilistic algorithms such that
• Dec takes as input the public seed s, an index i ∈ [k], and is given oracle access to a word w ∈ Σ n . Dec w (s, i) outputs a symbol b ∈ Σ (which is supposed to be the value at position i of the original message x i.e., the string x s.t. Enc(s, x) is closest codeword to w).
Similarly, the notional of a computational adversarial channel is almost identical except that the channel challenges the Dec with an index i ∈ [k] (as opposed to i ∈ [n]) and the decoder is supposed to output the ith bit of the original message. Apart from this change Definition E.2 and Definition 2.2 are identical.
Definition E.2 A computational adversarial channel A with error rate τ is an algorithm that interacts with a local code (Gen, Enc, Dec) in rounds, as follows. In each round of the execution, given a security parameter λ,
(4) The channel A corrupts at most τ n entries of c to obtain a word w ∈ Σ n and selects a challenge index i ∈ [k]; w is given to the receiver's Dec with query access along with the challenge index i.
(6) We define A(s)'s probability of fooling Dec on this round to be p A,s = Pr[b ∈ {⊥, x i }], where the probability is taken only over the randomness of the Dec w (s, i). We say that A(s) is γ-successful at fooling Dec if p A,s > γ. We say that A(s) is ρ-successful at limiting Dec if |Good A,s | < ρ·k, where Good A,s ⊆ [k] is the set of indices j such that Pr[Dec w (s, j) = x j ] > 2 3 . We use Fool A,s (γ, τ, λ) (resp. Limit A,s (ρ, τ, λ)) to denote the event that the attacker was γ-successful at fooling Dec (resp. ρ-successful at limiting Dec) on this round. Definition E.3 ((Computational) Relaxed Locally Decodable Codes (CRLDC)) A local code (Gen, Enc, Dec) is a (q, τ, ρ, γ(·), µ(·))-CRLCC against a class A of adversaries if Dec w makes at mostueries to w and satisfies the following:
(1) For all public seeds s if w ← Enc(s, x) then Dec w (s, i) outputs x i .
(2) For all A ∈ A we have Pr[Fool A,s (γ(λ), τ, λ)] ≤ µ(λ), where the randomness is taken over the selection of s ← Gen(1 λ ) as well as A's random coins.
When µ(λ) = 0, γ(λ) = 1 3 is a constant and A is the set of all (computationally unbounded) channels we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-RLDC. When µ(·) is a negligible function and A is restricted to the set of all probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) attackers we say that the code is a (q, τ, ρ, γ)-CRLDC (computational relaxed locally correctable code).
We say that a code that satisfies conditions 1 and 2 is a Weak CRLDC, while a code satisfying conditions 1, 2 and 3 is a Strong CRLDC code.
As we remarked in the main body of the paper our construction of a Strong CRLCC is also a strong CRLDC. In particular, Theorem E.4 is identical to Theorem 2.5 except that we replaced the word CRLCC with CRLDC.
Theorem E.4 Assuming the existence of a collision-resistant hash function (GenH, H) with length ℓ(λ), there exists a constant 0 < τ ′ < 1 and negligible functions µ(·), γ(·) such that for all τ ≤ τ ′ there exist constants 0 < r(τ ), ρ(τ ) < 1 such that there exists a (ℓ(λ) · polylog n, τ, ρ(τ ), γ(·), µ(·))-Strong CRLDC of blocklength n over the binary alphabet with rate r(τ ) where r(.) and ρ(.) have the property that lim τ →0 r(τ ) = 1 and lim τ →0 ρ(τ ) = 1. In particular, if ℓ(λ) = polylog λ and λ ∈ Θ(n) then the code is a (polylog n, τ, ρ, γ, µ(·))-Strong CRLDC.
Proof : (sketch) The encoding algorithm in our strong CRLDC and strong CRLCC constructions are identical. The only change that we need to make is to tweak the local decoding algorithm to output bits of the original message instead of bits of the codeword. This task turns out to be trivial. In particular, the first part of the codeword in our construction is formed by partitioning the original message x into mt blocks x = x 1 • . . . • x tm , partitioning these blocks into t groups T 1 = (x 1 • . . . x m ) , . . . , T t = x (t−1)m+1 • . . . x tm and outputting c j = ECC(T j ) for each j ≤ t. Because our rate r(τ ) approaches 1 these bits account for almost all of the codeword.
The CRLCC decoding algorithm is given (possibly tampered) codewordc =c 1 •c 2 . . .. When the decoding algorithm is challenged for one of the original bits of c j it works as follows: (1) use our randomized algorithm verify that the corresponding metanode v j in our graph is α-good (if not we output ⊥), (2) if v j is α-good then run ECCD (c j ) to recover the original T j = x (j−1)m+1 , . . . , x jm , (3) run ECC(T j ) to recover the original c j and then find the appropriate bit of the codeword to output. The CRLDC decoding algorithm can simply omit step (3). Once we have recovered the original T j we can find the appropriate bit of the original message to output.
